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The author of an article in the Michigan Law Review,$ after noting that
some jurisdictions require only the consent of the accused, said: "the latter
procedure is more in accord with the underlying conception of the waiver
plan. If trial by jury, as we have been contending, is a protection for the
benefit of the individual, then it is hardly consistent to require also the
consent of the court, or the prosecuting attorney, or both, as a condition
precedent to a trial without a jury. The act of the legislature is itself consent
by the state; and there is a curious contrariety in calling a jury trial a privilege
and then making its surrender subject to the control of the court."
ALAN WARCUP.
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Plaintiff, in purchasing from carrier a quantity

of fruit salad which had been frozen in transit, contracted not to permit the
goods to enter retail outlets under the shipper-manufacturer's label. Later,
plaintifl", with the assistance of its' employee Ross, sold the goods to Vizcarra
with the invoice reciting the restriction. Subsequently, Ross terminated his
employment with plaintiff, purchased part of the goods from Vizcarra, sold
par' of the salad to a retailer, and indicated an intention to dispose of the
remainder without regard to the restriction imposed by the plaintiff. Plaintiff's
suit for injunctive relief in lower court was granted and the District Court of
Appeal in affirming held, the contract requirement was not in restraint of
trade, and that an equitable servitude on chattels was created thereby which
was enforceable against a person who subsequently acquired the chattels
with notice of the restriction, notwithstanding lack of privity between such
person and the dealer. Nadell & Co. v. Grasso, 346 P.2d 505 (Cal. 1959).
The rule is well settled that restrictive agreements relating to real property,
classed as equitable servitudes, are enforceable against subsequent purchasers
who take with notice of the restriction.' In De Mattos v. Gibson,2 broad
equitable principles were enunciated which seemed sufficient to allow the
desired enforcement to restrictions on chattels. There the court said: "Reason
and justice seem to prescribe that . . . where a man . . . acquires property

from another, with knowledge of a previous contract . . . the acquirer shall
no .. . use and employ the property in a manner not allowable to the giver
0 seller ....
.. It was thought that these servitudes would receive judicial
approval, but in England, such restrictions were held binding on subsequent
purchasers with notice only when imposed on patented articles.3 This view
became more entrenched in England with one noteworthy exception decided
4
on equitable servitude principles.
8. Oppenheim, Waiver of Trial by Jury in Criminal Cases, 25 Mich. L. Rev. 695,
736 (1927).
1. Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Phillips 774, 1 H. & Tw. 105, 18 L.J. Ch. 83, 13 L.T. (O.S.)
21, 13 Jur. 89, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1848); 2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence 5th ed.
1941.) 954; McClintock, Equity 213 (1936). See also, Schmidt, Equitable Servitudes .n
Colorado, 33 Dicta 236, 237 (1956).
2. 4 De G. & J. 276, 45 Eng. Rep. 108, 110 (C.A. 1858).
3. Werderman v. Societe' Generale d'Electricite', 19 Ch.Div. 246 (1881); National
Phonograph Co. of Australia v. Menck, A.C. 336 (1911).
4. Lord Stratheona Steamship Co. v. Dominion Coal Co., A.C. 108 (1926) (The purchaser
with notice was enjoined from using a ship in a manner inconsistent with the charter
contract entered into by the original owner and the charter party).
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decisions agreed with the English view.
Professor
review article,( in tracing the development of the
methods for binding the subsequent purchaser of
the first method, the sub-contract device, was held

ineffective in England on the grounds that no consideration flowed from the
promisec to the sub-purchaser.7 In advocating the second method, he said,
the "notice, or equitable servitude device . . . bears a close resemblance to
the imposition of restrictions on land in the original recorded deed, of which
later purchasers are bound to take notice .......
8
He concluded by saying,
"Servitudes on chattels still seem possible and reasonable, although . .. long
investigation has not disclosed a single square decision establishing such a
9
conception in a court of last resort." This last statement exemplifies the
state of the law on such restrictions up to 1928.
Advocates of the doctrine thought they had support in the decisions sustaining price restrictions on resale where a manufacturer produces and sells
under a special brand a commodity in general use and which others manu0
facture and sell,1 as distinguished from the patent medicine, copyright, and
patent cases." However, in 1932, in the case of National Skee-Ball Co. v.
Seyfrfed,12 a heavy blow was struck at the advocates of enforcing servitudes
on chattels when the court, in denying relief, said, "" . . . research has not
revealed a single case in this state or elsewhere in which the courts have
favored the attachment of equitable servitudes on chattels, title to which
passes with delivery.""3
The impact of Federal and State legislation in the form of "fair trade
acts," copyright and patent laws, and the restraint of trade and unfair competition sections of the Sherman Act of 1890,14 further limited the doctrine,
5. Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 544 (1872); Hatch v. Adams, 22 Fed.
434 (C.C.E.D.Pa. 1884); Park v. Hartman, 153 Fed. 24, 39 (6th Cir. 1907). See
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917);
Baue- v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1 (1913); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220
U.S. 373 (1911); Bobbs- Merrill Co. v. Strans, 210 U.S. 339 (1908); Apollinaris Co. v.
Schere , 27 Fed. 18 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886); Garst v. Hall and Lyon Co., 179 Mass. 588,
590, 61 N.E. 219 (1901).
C. Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 Harv L. Rev. 945 (1928).
7. Id. at 952. The author cites Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Selfridge, A.C. 847, 84
L.J.K.B. 1680 (1915). See, Elliman v. Carrington, 2 Ch. 275 (1901).
S. Supra note 6, at 953.
9. Supra note 6, at 1013.
10. D. Ghirardelli Co. v. Hunsicker, 164 Cal. 355, 128 Pac. 1041 (1912); Grogan v.
Chaffee, 156 Cal. 611, 105 Pac. 745 (1909); Fisher Flouring Mills Co. v. Swanson, 76
Wash. 649, 137 Pac. 144 (1913). See Murphy v. Christian Press Ass'n Publishing Co., 38
App. Div. 426, 56 N.Y. Supp. 597 (1899) (Where injunction was granted to restrain use
o: electrotype plates by purchaser with notice in violation of the agreement); New York
Ban: Note Co. v. Hamilton Bank-Note Co., 83 Hun. 593, 31 N.Y. Supp. 1060 (1895),
aff'd
28 App.Div. 411, 50 N.Y. Supp. 1093 (1898) (Where use of printing presses was
restricted).
11. Supra, Note 5.
12. 110 N.J. Eq. 18, 158 At. 736 (1932) (Where agreement between manufacturer
and buyer o; skee-ball alleys, restricting use to specific locality, was held. not binding on
subsequent buyer with notice). Contra, P. Lorillard Co. v. Weingarden, 280 Fed. 238
(1922) (Where P sold stale cigarettes to X with restriction they were not to be sold in U.S.,
and X re-sold to D who had notice, injunction granted to restrain D from violating
restriction ).
13. Nat'l. Skee-Ball Co. v. Seyfried, 110 N.J. Eq. 18, 158 At. 736, 738 (1932). See
Kgelly v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 11 F. Supp. 497, 508 (S.D. N.Y. 1935)
(Where court said: "While the scope of this doctrine remains as yet undefined it is clear
that the vast gap between. . .Tulk v. Moxhay. . and. . .the case at bar has not been
bridged.")
14. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
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by taking potentially applicable situations involving goods and products, out
of the un-regulated and placing them under statutory regulation. Thus, the
trend of the courts in curtailing the doctrine as to chattels became more
crystallized. This view was further exemplified by the 1940 United States
Supreme Court decision in Ethyl Gasoline Corporation v. United States.1 6
Since this case involved a patented product, and resulted in prohibiting the
patentee from restricting his licensee, by analogy, the case for enforcing
servitudes on non-patented articles would appear to be considerably
weakened, if not destroyed.
Finally, in 1956, Professor Chafee, in a second law review article,16
soundly criticized the decision in Pratte v. Balatsos,1 7 in Which the court
enforced an equitable servitude on a juke box. He further stated -that from
1928 to 1956, he had found only "seven cases of attempts to bind personal
property by restrictions unsanctioned by legislation, and only three of these
were successful."' In a re-evaluation of his earlier opinions in the light of
present developments, he concluded that, "Where chattels are involved and
not just land or a business, the policy in favor of mobility creates even
stronger cause for courts to hesitate and scrutinize carefully factors of social
desirability before imposing novel burdens on property, in the hands ol
transferees."19
The court in the instant case disposed of the problem by applying broad,
equitable principles based on the enforcement of servitudes on land. By
analogy then, these principles were applied to chattels. It is clear that the
plaintiff had an inadequate remedy at law, and the court made an honest
attempt to do justice between the parties by the application of equitable
principle. 2 0 However, one question remains, and that is, whether or not
the doctrine of equitable servitudes on chattels should have been dredged
up out of the past and applied to the facts in this case? It is submitted that
there was an alternative method of arriving at the same conclusion. Since by
statute California has determined that, "the good wxill z l of a business is
property . . . ,"22 it would seem that the acts of the defendant in interfering
with "the expectation of continued public patronage," would be the basis for

15. 309 U.S. 436 (1940).
16. Chafee, The Music Goes Round and Round: Equitable Servitudes and Chattels,
69 Harv. L. Rev. 1250 (1956).
17. 99 N.H. 430, 113 A.2d 492 (1955).
18. Chafee, supra note 16, at 1255. Restriction upheld in In Re Waterson, Berlin &
Snyder Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 36 F.2d 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1929), modified in 48 F.2d 704
(2d Cir. 1931); Metropolitan Opera Ass'n. Inc. v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199
Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd mem., 279 App. Div. 632, 107,
N.Y.S.2d 795 (1st Dep't 1951); Waring v. W'DAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa.
433, 194 Ati. 631 (1937). See also, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 171 (1937); 64 Harv. L. Rev.
682 (1951). Coutra: RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
311 U.S. 712 (1940); Barron G. Collier, Inc. v. Paddock, 37 Ariz. 194, 291 Pac. 1000
(1930); Nat'l. Skee-Ball Co. v. Seyfried, 110 N.J. Eq. 18, 158 Ad. 736 (1932); Montgomery v. Creager, 22 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929). See, Chafee,Unfair Competi-.
tion. 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1289, 1319-20 (1940).
19. Chafee, supra note 16, at 1261.
20. In the instant case, the court did justify itself by quoting a familiar equitable
rule: "Equity does not wait upon precedent which exactly squares. with the facts in
contioversy, but will assert itself in those situations where right and justice would be
defeated but for -its intervention."
21. West's Ann. Bus. & Prof. Ceode, § 14100 (1959) ("the good will-of a business is
the expectation of continued public patronage").
22. West's Ann. Bus. & Prof. Code § 14102 (1959).
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injunctive relief as being an unfair trade practice. 23 This approach would
give relief in a situation where equity demands justice, and would not result
in uncertain law, as a reliance on the doctrine of equitable servitudes as
applied to chattels has caused in the past.
WESLEY N. HARRY.

TRIAL - INSTRUCTIONS TO JuRY - DUTY OF COURT TO INSTRUCT ON ITS
OwN MOTION. -Plaintiff,
a track laborer, brought an action to recover
,damages for personal injuries sustained in a collision between the hand car
on which he was riding, and a pick-up truck driven by the defendant. The
latter's defense consisted of a general denial followed by a plea of contributory negligence. There were no instructions given nor requested concerning
the issue of contributory negligence. The jury returned a verdict for the
plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held, two justices dissenting,
that while the instructions standing alone could be subject to criticism, when
considered together they fairly submitted the issues to the jury and no
reversible error existed. Moddy v. Childers, 344 P.2d 262 (Okl. 1959). The
dissent stated that contributory negligence is a fundamental issue of law,
and as such it was the court's duty, on its own motion, to instruct correctly
on it.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has repeatedly maintained, in negligence
actions, that it is the duty of the court, on its own motion, to give instrnctions
which fairly state the law applicable to the fact situation, and that failure to
do so is reversible error.'
Contributory negligence should be considered a fundamental issue in all
cases in which it is involved.2 In the instant case the defendant failed to
request instructions on contributory negligence. The majority holding makes
no mention of such an instruction, but from the facts given it could well
have been a determinative factor. Giving proper instructions on the issue in
a case, according to one legal writer, is a judicial duty as the judge is charged
with knowledge of the law, and the parties have an absolute right to an
3
instruction on the applicable rules of law.

It has been held, that a failure of the court to give a certain instruction
cannot be raised on appeal if no request was made for it at the trial. 4 In at
least one jurisdiction the rule seems to be that the court has no right to
instruct on its own initiative, nor are the parties required to ask for instruc23. West's Ann. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17000 (1959) (Unfair Trade Practices); West's
Ann. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16900 (1959) (Fair Trade Contracts). See also, 24 Ops.
Atty. Gen 278 (Cal. 1959).
1. Oklahoma Transportation Company v. Green, 344 P.2d 660 (Oki. 1959). (This case
was decided seven days after a rehearing was denied the instant case. It was held, that
negligence on the part of either driver was a fundamental issue in the case, and since
it was specifically pleaded, and evidence introduced in support of that defense, the
defendant was entitled to have the jury properly instructed thereon, even without such

. request.); Garner v. Myers, 318 P.2d 410 (Oki. 1957) (Ct. cites Tit. 12 O.S. 1951 §
577 subd. 3); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Baty, 189 Oki. 180, 114 P.2d 935 (1941) (Ct.
cites 12 Okl. Stat. Ann. § 577 subd. 5); Beams v. Young, 92 Oki. 294 222 Pac. 952
(1923); First National Bank of Mounds v. Cox, 83 Old. 1, 200 Pac. 238 (1921).
2. Roadway Express, Inc., v. Baty, supra, note 1.

3. 1 REID, BRANSON INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES § 5 (3rd ed. 1960).
4. Wallace v. Riales, 218 Ark. 70, 234 S.W.2d 199 (1950); Cobb v. Marshall Field
e: Co., 22 Il. App.2d 143, 159 N.E.2d 520 (1959) (Statutory requirement).

